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Abstract
Probabilistic forecasts are becoming more and more available. How should they be used and
communicated? What are the obstacles to their use in practice? I review experience with five
problems where probabilistic forecasting played an important role. This leads me to identify
five types of potential users: Low Stakes Users, who don’t need probabilistic forecasts;
General Assessors, who need an overall idea of the uncertainty in the forecast; Change
Assessors, who need to know if a change is out of line with expectatations; Risk Avoiders,
who wish to limit the risk of an adverse outcome; and Decision Theorists, who quantify
their loss function and perform the decision-theoretic calculations. This suggests that it is
important to interact with users and to consider their goals. The cognitive research tells us
that calibration is important for trust in probability forecasts, and that it is important to
match the verbal expression with the task. The cognitive load should be minimized, reducing
the probabilistic forecast to a single percentile if appropriate. Probabilities of adverse events
and percentiles of the predictive distribution of quantities of interest seem often to be the
best way to summarize probabilistic forecasts. Formal decision theory has an important role,
but in a limited range of applications.
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1 Introduction
Much progress has been made over the past few decades in the development of methods
for probabilistic forecasting, and probabilistic forecasts are now routinely used in several
disciplines. These include finance, where trading decisions are made based on predictive
distributions of assets, often using automated computer trading programs. In marketing,
predictive distributions of future sales and inventory are commonly made using statistical
models such as ARIMA models (Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel, 2008), and used as the basis for
stocking and other decisions.
However, in other areas the development of probabilistic forecasting methods is more
recent, and use of these methods in practice is at an earlier stage. How should probabilistic
forecasts be used and communicated? What are the obstacles to their use in practice? Can
these be overcome? Can they be presented in ways that make them more useful to possibly
sceptical users?
Communicating uncertainty is inherently a challenging problem. Kahneman (2011) iden-
tified people’s resistance to uncertainty as
“a puzzling limitation of our mind: our excessive confidence in what we believe we
know, and our apparent inability to acknowledge the full extent of our ignorance
and the uncertainty of the world we live in. We are prone to overestimate how
much we understand the world and to underestimate the role of chance in events.
Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty of hindsight.”
There are various possible explanations for this. One is that people’s cognitive bandwidth
is limited, and uncertainty information increases cognitive load. For example, adding a range
to a point or “best” forecast triples the cognitive load.
A more fundamental explanation is proposed, again by Kahneman (2011):
“An unbiased appreciation of uncertainty is a cornerstone of rationality, but it
is not what people and organizations want. Extreme uncertainty is paralyzing
under dangerous circumstances, and the admission that one is merely guessing is
especially unacceptable when the stakes are high. Acting on pretended knowledge
is often the preferred solution.”
A related possible explanation arises when forecasters and decision-makers are different
people, as is often the case in policy-making contexts. Then the decision-maker may wish to
push the responsibility for the decision onto the forecaster, and when the forecasters provides
a range or a probabilistic forecast, this is harder to do than when a single number is given.
If things go wrong, it’s easier to blame the forecaster who gave an incorrect forecast.
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In this article, I will describe experience with probabilistic forecasting in five different
contexts and try to draw some conclusions. These will lead me to identify five types of poten-
tial users of probabilistic forecasts: Low Stakes Users, General Assessors, Change Assessors,
Risk Avoiders, and Decision Theorists. Each may have different needs.
Some suggestions are that it is important to interact with users and consider their goals;
ways of doing this include meetings and web surveys. This is a cognitive problem as well
as a statistical one. The cognitive research tells us that calibration is important for trust
in probability forecasts, and that it is important to match the verbal expression with the
goal. The cognitive load should be minimized to the extent possible, even reducing the
probabilistic forecast to a single number if appropriate. Probabilities of adverse events and
percentiles of the predictive distribution of quantities of interest seem often to be the best
way to summarize probabilistic forecasts.
Formal decision theory has an important role in a limited range of applications, particu-
larly when users are aware of their loss functions, and when there is agreement on the loss
function to use. This arises most clearly when costs and losses are measured in monetary
terms. Decision theory is also useful in research on the use of probabilistic forecasts, to
analyze different possible decision rules.
This article is organized as follows. In the following sections I will describe experience
with five problems where probabilistic forecasting played an important role: setting aborig-
inal whaling quotas, probabilistic weather forecasting, projecting the worldwide HIV/AIDS
epidemic, probabilistic population projections for the UN, and deciding on the number of
funded graduate students to admit. I will then discuss what conclusions can be drawn from
this experience.
2 Setting Aboriginal Bowhead Whaling Quotas
For centuries, the Western Arctic stock of bowhead whales, Balaena mysticetus, off the coasts
of Alaska and Siberia, has been the object of small-scale subsistence hunting by the Inuit,
or Eskimo, peoples of the area, for whom it is vital both nutritionally and culturally; see
Figure 1. The stock was severely depleted by commercial whaling by Yankee and European
whalers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Commercial whaling of bowhead whales
(although not other whale species) effectively ended around 1915, and the species was first
protected legally from commercial whaling from 1931 by the League of Nations Convention,
and then by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), founded in 1946.
This left the question of whether and how to regulate aboriginal whaling by the Inuit. It
was generally recognized that it would be unfair to penalize the Inuit people for a problem
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Figure 1: Left: Bowhead whale, Balaena mysticetus. Right: Community celebration after
Inuit bowhead whale hunt.
that was not of their making, since they had been whaling sustainably for centuries, and that
to ban aboriginal whaling would damage their livelihood and culture. This led to a tension
between two conflicting goals: on the one hand, to protect the whale stock and allow it to
recover to its pre-commercial whaling levels, and on the other hand to satisfy the subsistence
and cultural needs of the Inuit people.
The IWC’s solution was to allow continued limited aboriginal subsistence whaling, but
with a quota to be set at a level low enough to allow the stock to recover. A key quantity for
setting the quota in a given future year is the replacement yield (RY) in that year, namely
the greatest number of whales that could be taken without the population decreasing. This is
unknown and is subject to considerable uncertainty. Because it is important that the quota
not exceed this unknown value, a conservative value or “lower bound” is sought, which should
take account of all nonnegligible sources of uncertainty.
The future RY has traditionally been forecast using a deterministic population dynamics
model, in which births are added and natural deaths and kills are subtracted. This requires
as inputs age-specific fertility and natural mortality rates, and outputs the population for
each future year, broken down by age and sex. The inputs are unknown and subject to
considerable uncertainty.
Until 1991, the lower bound was set by doing several runs of the model with different
scenarios or variants, consisting of combinations of “central,” “high,” and “low” values of the
inputs. The range of values of RY output was then treated as a rough prediction interval. In
1991, however, the IWC Scientific Committee rejected this approach as statistically invalid,
noting that it had no probabilistic interpretation and could lead to, for example, decisions
that were riskier than they seemed. They recommended that statistically principled methods
be developed.
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Figure 2: Posterior Predictive Distribution of the 1990 Replacement Yield of Bowhead
Whales, obtained by Bayesian Melding. Source: Raftery, Givens and Zeh (1995).
In response to this, we developed the Bayesian melding method for making inference
about outputs from the population dynamics model, taking account of all known substantial
uncertainties about the inputs (Raftery, Givens, and Zeh, 1992, 1995; Poole and Raftery,
2000). This yielded a posterior predictive distribution for RY for future years; an example
is shown in Figure 2.
Once this was available, the IWC Scientific Committee recommended that the 5th per-
centile of this distribution be taken as a precautionary lower bound on RY, and thus as
an upper bound on the allowed hunting quota. The recommendation was accepted by the
Commission itself (consisting mostly of politicians and senior civil servants, such as Fish-
eries Ministers and officials from the then 40 IWC member countries). Taking account of
this lower bound, the desire to allow a margin for future recovery of the stock, and the Inuit
subsistence and cultural needs, the Commission set a quota slightly below the lower bound.
This approach was used successfully for the following ten years. Over that period, the
bowhead whale stock prospered, indeed increasing substantially, while the Inuit whale hunt
continued and the related Inuit culture was preserved. The basic statistical ideas have since
been used for other wildlife management problems (Powell et al., 2006; Brandon et al., 2007;
Falk et al., 2010).
The 5th percentile of the posterior predictive distribution effectively became the “point
forecast” for this problem. To calculate it, it was necessary to compute the full posterior
distribution. But once the 5th percentile had been calculated and agreed as valid by the
IWC Scientific Committee, most of the policy-making attention focused on it, and the rest
of the distribution (including measures of its center such as the median or mode) was largely
ignored. Thus the cognitive load was no larger than for a single “best” forecast.
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Also, the responsibility for making a single best forecast had been met by the forecasters
(in this case the IWC Scientific Committee) — only in this case it was a lower bound rather
than a predictive median or mode, or a deterministic point forecast. Probabilistic forecasts
were important in this application because the first priority was to limit the risk of an adverse
outcome, namely a decrease of the whale stock.
Note that formal decision theory was not used in this problem. The IWC Scientific
Committee has considered using formal decision theory for such problems, but in general
has not done so, because they considered that reaching agreement on the relative costs
involved was not feasible. For example, what is the ratio of the cost to the stock of killing
a whale to the benefit to the Inuit community? Consensus on the answers to questions like
these would be hard to achieve (Punt and Donovan, 2007; Cooke et al., 2009, 2012).
Instead, the preferred approach was to set the quota so that the risk of the stock decreas-
ing as a result would be no more than 5%, and this eventually commanded broad agreement,
even in a body where debates have often been contentious because of the environmental
sensitivities associated with whaling.
3 Probabilistic Weather Forecasting
3.1 Methods and Probcast Website
Probabilistic weather forecasts consist of predictive probability distributions of future weather
quantities. In particular they yield probabilities of future adverse weather events, such as
freezing temperatures, high rainfall or wind storms. Since 1992, probabilistic weather fore-
casts have been produced by major weather forecasting agencies using ensembles of deter-
ministic numerical weather predictions (Gneiting and Raftery, 2005). However, these have
been little used as the basis for public forecasts, because they are typically poorly calibrated.
In response to this situation, methods for postprocessing ensembles to produce calibrated
probabilistic weather forecasts have been developed, based on statistical methods, including
ensemble Bayesian model averaging (Raftery et al., 2005) and ensemble model output statis-
tics (EMOS) (Gneiting et al., 2005). In addition to temperature, methods were developed
for precipitation (Sloughter et al., 2007), wind speeds (Sloughter et al., 2010), wind direc-
tions (Bao et al., 2010), wind vectors (Sloughter et al., 2013), and visibility (Chmielecki and
Raftery, 2011).
Based on these forecasts, we set up a prototype real-time probabilistic weather forecasting
website for the general public in the North American Pacific Northwest, at www.probcast.com
(Mass et al., 2009); see Figure 3. Its design and content were based on extensive cognitive
experiments and ethnographic studies of forecasters and end-users (Joslyn and Jones, 2008;
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Figure 3: Screenshot of the Probabilistic Weather Forecasting Website at
www.probcast.com.
Joslyn et al., 2008; Nadav-Greenberg et al., 2008; Joslyn et al., 2009; Joslyn and Savelli,
2010).
The website contains three kinds of information. First are percentiles of decision-critical
weather quantities, namely temperature and the amount of precipitation. The 10th, 50th
and 90th percentiles of future temperature are given. For precipitation the (upper) 90th
percentile is given.
The second kind of information consists of probabilities of adverse weather events of
common interest, namely freezing temperatures, precipitation (defined as more than 0.01
inches in the 12-hour period of the forecast), heavy precipitation (defined as more than 0.25
inches), and very heavy precipitation (defined as more than 1 inch). When the probabilities
are below 5%, these fields are left blank. The third kind of information consists of maps of
any of the percentiles or probabilities in the upper part of the web page, showing how they
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Figure 4: Icons used in cognitive experiments to compare the relative effectiveness of
different icons for probability of precipitation: question mark icon (where the icon is darker
when the probability is higher), pie icon and bar icon. Source: Joslyn et al. (2009).
vary over the spatial domain.
The kinds of display used were chosen on the basis of cognitive experiments. For exam-
ple, to choose the icon representing probability of precipitation seen in Figure 3, cognitive
experiments were carried out to compare the relative effectiveness of several kinds of icon
(Joslyn et al., 2009). Three of the icons are shown in Figure 4: a question mark icon, a
pie icon, and a bar icon. In the question mark icon, higher probability of precipitation is
represented by darker colors. The pie icon produced the fewest misunderstandings among
study participants and so was used on the Probcast website.
On the Probcast website we gave the 10th and 90th percentiles of temperature, corre-
sponding to an 80% prediction interval. There is a trade-off in choosing the default proba-
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bility levels to display: larger intervals (e.g. the 95% interval) contain a higher proportion of
actual outcomes, but they are also much wider, and hence may be judged less useful. In the
event, we received almost no requests for higher probability level intervals, and so we stuck
with the 80% intervals. It would of course be possible to display multiple probability levels,
but this would add to the cognitive load and so make the website harder to use.
3.2 Cognitive Findings
An important part of the probabilistic weather forecasting project consisted of carrying
out cognitive experiments to determine how best to convey the uncertainty information.
There is a long tradition in psychology of assessing people’s understanding of probability
and uncertainty by offering them simple gambles (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), but less
research on how best to communicate uncertainty about complex real-life outcomes.
Calibration of the probability forecast (e.g. 80% prediction intervals contain the truth
80% of the time on average) is an important requirement for probabilistic forecasts (Gneiting
et al., 2007). One series of experiments showed that providing calibrated probability forecasts
improve weather-related decision-making and increases trust in the forecast (Joslyn et al.,
2007; Nadav-Greenberg and Joslyn, 2009; Joslyn and LeClerc, 2012). This is good news for
probabilistic forecasting, showing that ordinary people can understand and use probabilities
to improve their decision-making.
Joslyn and Savelli (2010) found that users of standard (deterministic) weather forecasts
have well-formed uncertainty expectations, suggesting that they are prepared to understand
explicit uncertainty forecasts for a wide range of parameters. Indeed, explicit uncertainty
estimates may be necessary to overcome some of the anticipated forecast biases that may
be affecting the usefulness of existing weather forecasts. Despite the fact that these bias
expectations are largely unjustified, they could lead to adjustment of forecasts that could in
turn have serious negative consequences for users, especially with respect to extreme weather
warnings.
Joslyn et al. (2008) reported on a series of experiments to investigate the effects of various
aspects of how probability forecasts are presented: framing (positive versus negative), format
(frequency versus probability), probability (low versus high), and compatibility between the
presentation and the decision task. They showed that the key factor is the match between
the verbal expression and the task goal. The other three factors (framing, format and
probability) made a much smaller difference.
In one experiment, people were asked to decide whether or not to post a wind advisory
for winds above 20 knots, and were given probability information. When people were told
the probability that wind speed would be above 20 knots, they made few errors. However,
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when they were told the probability that wind speed would be below 20 knots, they made
far more errors, even though the information is mathematically equivalent. This indicates
that when the verbal expression and the task were mismatched, more errors were made.
Another series of experiments was carried out to assess whether it was better to present
probability forecasts in terms of probability (e.g. 10% chance) or frequency (e.g. 1 time
in 10). It has been argued that uncertainty presented as frequency is easier for people
to understand (Fiedler, 1988; Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999). However, Joslyn and Nichols
(2009) found that people better understood the forecast when it was presented in probability
format rather than a frequency format, in contrast with the earlier research. This is more
good news for probabilistic forecasting, indicating again that ordinary people can understand
probabilities.
3.3 Assessment
Overall, the Probcast website has been reasonably successful, attracting about two million
unique visits since it was set up in 2005 (Jones, 2011). Public probabilistic weather forecast-
ing (beyond probability of precipitation, which has been issued by the U.S. National Weather
Service for about 40 years) is now being considered and evaluated by several national and
other weather agencies, and Probcast provides both a methodology for producing calibrated
probabilistic forecasts and a model of how they might be communicated to the public. It has
also been cited by National Research Council (2006) as a possible model for communication
of uncertainty in weather forecasting.
While specialists sometimes argue that the public doesn’t understand probabilities and
so that there’s little point in issuing probabilistic forecasts, the research results from the
Probcast project suggest otherwise. The cognitive results indicate that users are ready for
explicit uncertainty statements in forecasts, and that including them can improve decision-
making and increase trust in the forecast. The fairly wide public use of the Probcast website,
in spite of its lack of substantial institutional backing and its narrow geographic range
(the North American Pacific Northwest), suggest that the public is ready for probabilistic
forecasts on a broader scale, although of course only a portion of the public would actively
use them (notably those with higher-stakes weather-related decisions to make).
The cognitive experiments carried out as part of our project by Susan Joslyn’s re-
search group at the University of Washington suggest that probabilities of particular adverse
weather events (e.g. freezing temperatures, precipitation, heavy precipitation, high winds),
and percentiles (10th, 50th, 90th) of the predictive distribution of continuous weather quan-
tities of interest (e.g. temperature, amount of precipitation, wind speed) are useful quantities
to provide to users (Savelli and Joslyn, 2013). The work suggests that both are understand-
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able to people and that they make better decisions when they have this information.
A common prescription is that probabilities should be used in decision-making using
decision theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). This says that each possible outcome
imposes a loss on the decision-maker, and that the decision made should minimize the
expected overall loss. In this case the expectation would be taken over possible future
weather outcomes, and the losses might relate, for example, to the costs of issuing a high
wind warning if no high winds occur, and to the damage that high winds would cause in the
absence of a warning. This seems to be a very useful framework when the utilities associated
with different outcomes can be quantified on the same scale, typically money. The clearest
weather example that I know of is decision-making by wind energy companies that have to
bid for contracts to provide specified amounts of energy at given prices and with specified
penalties for failing to fulfil the contract, in the presence of great uncertainty about future
wind speeds (Pinson et al., 2007).
However, we did not incorporate decision-theoretic concepts explicitly into the Probcast
website. It seems that most people are unaware of their utility functions, and may even be
unwilling to specify them when the losses involved are on different scales (e.g. money versus
possible loss of life). Thus people may find it easier to use probabilistic forecasts to make
decisions that limit the risk of adverse outcomes to acceptable levels, rather than carrying
out a full decision-theoretic analysis.
Nevertheless, (Joslyn and LeClerc, 2012) showed that when costs and benefits are on the
same scale (e.g. money), while people do not match the optimal decision-making standard,
they are closer to it when they have probabilistic information. (Joslyn and LeClerc, 2012)
also found that if people were given decision advice based on optimal decision-theoretic
calculations, they followed the advice only if they were also given the probabilities.
4 Projecting the HIV/AIDS Epidemic
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) publishes updated esti-
mates and projections of the number of people living with HIV/AIDS in the countries with
generalized epidemics every two years. Generalized epidemics are defined by overall preva-
lence being above 1% and the epidemic not being confined to particular subgroups; there
are about 38 such countries (Ghys et al., 2004). UNAIDS projections are typically provided
for no more than five years into the future. As part of this, statements of uncertainty are
also provided.
This exercise has two main goals. The first is to develop estimation and projection
methods and software for use by country health officials for planning, for example to meet
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Figure 5: Uncertainty Statements in Estimates and Projections of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic.
Left: Estimates of global number of new HIV infections, 2001–2012, with uncertainty bounds,
from UNAIDS’ main annual public statement. Source: UNAIDS (2013). Right: Estimates
and projections of HIV prevalence in Gabon, 1970–2015, based on antenatal clinic data up
to 2009; the bands for 2010–2015 summarize probabilistic projections. The results are shown
for two different models, EPP and R-flex, and the observed prevalence at individual clinics
is shown by unfilled circles. Source: Bao et al. (2012).
future medication needs. There, statements of uncertainty may be used, for example, for
determining the amount of medication needed to be reasonably sure of having enough to
meet the need; this would correspond to an upper percentile of the predictive distribution.
The second goal is to contribute to the basis for the UNAIDS annual reports (UNAIDS,
2013). Uncertainty statements about estimates are routine in the UNAIDS reports, perhaps
because UNAIDS is a newer agency, established in 1996, by which time it had become the
norm to include uncertainty measures of some kind with estimates of uncertain quantities.
See Figure 5(a) for an example. While the uncertainty statements do not feature prominently
in the published report for the broad public, they underlie assessments in the report such as
the following:
“The annual number of new HIV infections among adults and adolescents de-
creased by 50% or more in 26 countries between 2001 and 2012. However, other
countries are not on track to halve sexual HIV transmission, which underscores
the importance of intensifying prevention efforts.”
The phrase “not on track” reflects conclusions drawn in part from probabilistic projections.
We developed methods for assessing uncertainty about estimates and projections using
Bayesian melding (Alkema et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2008; Bao et al., 2012). One example
of the output is shown in Figure 5(b). Figures such as these typically do not make their
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way into the most visible public reports; instead they provide background support for the
conclusions presented in these reports.
There seem to be two main kinds of use for the probabilistic estimates and projections
developed by UNAIDS. The first is to provide a general assessment of the estimates and
projections and how accurate they are likely to be.
The second kind of use is to assess changes. For example, reported HIV prevalence might
increase in a given year, but the question then arises whether the increase is out of the
range of normal expections, perhaps warranting some new policy intervention. Probabilistic
forecasts such as those summarized by the uncertainty bands in Figure 5(b) can be useful
in this context. For example, if the new estimated prevalence is inside the range of the
projection (even if there is an increase), then there is little evidence that what is happening
is out of what could be expected in the normal run of things, and the chosen policy could be
to continue as before while monitoring the situation. On the other hand, if the new estimate
is outside the projected range, there may be grounds for concern and for an intervention.
5 Probabilistic Population Projections for the United
Nations
The United Nations (UN) publishes projections of the populations of all countries broken
down by age and sex, updated every two years in a publication called the World Popula-
tion Prospects (WPP). It is the only organization to do so. These projections are used by
researchers, international organizations and governments, particularly those with less de-
veloped statistical systems, and researchers. They are used for planning, social and health
research, monitoring development goals, and as inputs to other forecasting models such as
those used for predicting climate change and its impacts (Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, 2007; Seto et al., 2012). They are the de facto standard (Lutz and Samir,
2010).
Like almost all other population projections, the UN’s projections are produced using
the standard cohort-component projection method (Whelpton, 1936; Leslie, 1945; Preston
et al., 2001). This is a deterministic method based on an age-structured version of the basic
demographic identity that the number of people in a country at time t + 1 is equal to the
number at time t plus the number of births, minus the number of deaths, plus the number
of immigrants, minus the number of emigrants.
The UN projections are based on assumptions about future fertility, mortality and in-
ternational migration rates; given these rates the UN produces the “Medium” projection, a
single value of each future population number with no statement of uncertainty. The UN
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also produces “Low” and “High” projections using total fertility rates (the average number
of children per woman) that are, respectively, half a child lower and half a child higher
than the Medium projections. These are alternative scenarios that have no probabilistic
interpretation.
Like the UN up to 2008, most national statistical offices, including the U.S. Census
Bureau and the U.K. Office of National Statistics, use assumptions about future fertility,
mortality and migration rates from experts: either internal experts or panels of outside
experts. Expert knowledge is an essential part of the population projection process, and
experts are generally agreed to be good at assembling and reviewing the underlying science,
as well as assessing the actual forecasts.
However, evidence has been mounting over the past 60 years that experts in several
domains are less good at producing forecasts themselves from scratch. Meehl (1954) found
that very simple statistical models beat expert human forecasters overall in a range of clinical
disciplines, and this finding has been replicated in many subsequent studies (Meehl, 1986).
Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) showed that expert forecasts of life expectancy at birth, both by
leading demographers and forecasting organizations, had performed poorly over the previous
70 years. Forecasters generally tended to project that the future would be like the present,
and in particular that a limit to life expectancy would be reached soon, whereas in fact life
expectancy continued to increase throughout the period.
Tetlock (2005) evaluated the quality of about 3,000 forecasts of political events and out-
comes by experts, many highly distinguished, and found their performance to be startlingly
poor. He memorably concluded that many of the experts would have been beaten by a
“dart-throwing chimpanzee.” In a rare counterexample, Mandel and Barnes (2014) found
that analysts in a Canadian intelligence agency provided calibrated forecasts of good quality.
In collaboration with the UN Population Division, we developed new statistical methods
for projecting future fertility and mortality rates probabilistically, and translating these into
probabilistic population projections for all countries (Alkema et al., 2011; Raftery et al.,
2012, 2013; Fosdick and Raftery 2014; Raftery, Lalic et al., 2014; Raftery, Alkema and
Gerland, 2014).
An experimental version of the new probabilistic projections was issued by the UN in
November 2012, at http://esa.un.org/unpd/ppp. This release was accompanied by no fan-
fare, but the experimental probabilistic projections have still had about 10,000 downloads
per month. Official UN probabilistic population projections for all countries were issued for
the first time on the same website on July 11, 2014 (World Population Day).
There are other indications of the beginning of a paradigm shift from deterministic popu-
lation projections based on expert assumptions to probabilistic population projections based
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on statistical models. Statistics New Zealand changed its official population projection
method to probabilistic projections in 2012 (Bryant, 2014).
But these releases are recent, and it remains to be seen how and to what extent ultimate
users, such as policy-makers and planners, make use of them. One possible use is in setting
future international goals, similar to the Millenium Development Goals for 2015 for things like
child and maternal mortality. It is desirable to set goals that are ambitious but also realistic,
and probabilistic projections could be useful in indicating what is realistic, suggesting setting
goals that are towards the “good” end of the probability distribution (Gerland, 2014).
A possible use of probabilistic population projections is in making decisions about policy
issues that depend directly on future population numbers, such as school and hospital in-
frastructure. One such decision is whether or not to close schools. These decisions are often
based on deterministic population projections, which can have a spurious air of certainty. It
is not desirable to close a school unless the probability of having to reopen it or find other
premises in the future is small (Louis, 2012).
Even if a deterministic population projection points to school enrollments declining, there
can still be a substantial probability of them staying essentially constant or even increasing,
in which case closing the school would typically not be a good idea. Basing such decisions on
reasonable upper percentiles of future school enrollments (such as the 90th percentile), rather
than on a deterministic projection or a predictive mean or median, could be a reasonable
approach.
6 Conditional Probabilistic Forecasts: HowMany Grad-
uate Students to Admit?
Like most U.S. academic departments with graduate programs, the Department of Statistics
at the University of Washington, of which I am a faculty member, faces the problem of
deciding how many potential entering graduate students to make funded offers to for the
next academic year. Offers are made in December for entry in the following September, nine
months later, and are binding on the department.
Entering graduate students are funded by a mix of teaching assistantships, fellowships
and research assistantships. There are several major uncertainties to deal with in making
this decision. The number of research assistantships available depends on the outcome of
faculty research grant applications, which are often unknown nine months ahead of time.
Not all students accept our offers, and we do not know ahead of time how many will. We
also do not know exactly how many current students will leave in the next nine months
through graduation or dropout.
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Up to 2009, departmental practice was to make a number of offers based on expected
numbers of students graduating and grants, and on an assumed acceptance rate. However,
these calculations were based only on expectations and were not probabilistic, and also did
not incorporate past data in a systematic way.
This often led in practice to too few acceptances relative to the number of positions
available, with the result that teaching assistants for Statistics courses had to be recruited
from among non-Statistics graduate students. This was undesirable in that statistics teach-
ing was not being done by optimally qualified people, departmental teaching assistantships
were “lost” to other departments, and the pool of future potential research assistants was
depleted. Also, there are currently more jobs available for Ph.D. statisticians that graduates,
so increasing the number of entering graduate students is desirable from the labor market
point of view as well. In the five years up to 2009, about four teaching assistantships were
being “lost” to the department every year, compared with a typical incoming class size of
about ten graduate students.
The downside is that if students accept and there is no identified funding for them, the
deparment has to scramble to find funding. This is difficult but possible within the university,
because many non-Statistics departments have research and teaching needs for statistically
qualified people that they find it hard to meet from within their own pool of students.
In 2010, the departmental faculty decided to base the decision about the number of
students to admit on a probabilistic calculation instead of the then current expectation-
based approach, and I took on the task of developing the appropriate method. For each
possible number of offers, I computed the predictive probability distribution of the number
of TA positions lost to the department, as this seemed to be the key quantity for decision-
making. Ideally this would be equal to zero.
With perfect knowledge, the number of TA positions lost conditional on a given number
of offers is equal to
Y = T +R1 +R2 +G+ L+D − C − A, (1)
where
Y = Number of TA positions lost to department
T = Number of TA positions available
R1 = Number of RA positions available within the department
R2 = Number of RA positions available outside the department
G = Number of students graduating by September
L = Number of students dropping program by September
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C = Number of current students
A = Number of acceptances.
T and C are taken as known exactly, but the other quantities in equation (1) are uncertain
at the time when the decision has to be made.
The predictive distributions of R1, R2, G, L, and A are derived from past data and
elicited information. They are treated as independent in order to derive a joint distribution.
The predictive distribution of A depends on the number of offers, O, and is modeled as
Binomial (O, pi), where pi is estimated from historical data. The predictive distribution
of R1 is obtained by polling departmental faculty to elicit from each of them a predictive
distribution of the number of research assistantships they will have available in the next
academic year. The distribution of R1 is then the distribution of the sum of the numbers
from faculty, obtained by convolving the elicited distributions. The predictive distributions
of R2 and L are based on historical data on these quantities; empirical rather than model-
based distributions are used. The predictive distribution of G is based on current information
about student progress and is typically quite tight.
The predictive distribution of Y , the number of lost TA positions, which is the primary
quantity for decision-making, is then obtained by Monte Carlo. A large number of values
of each of R1, R2, G, L, and A are simulated from their predictive distributions, and the
corresponding simulated values of Y are found from equation (1).
Figure 6 shows conditional predictive distributions of the number of lost TA positions
given several possible number of offers, and Table 1 shows percentiles of these distributions.
Note that negative numbers correspond to the number of students that would not be funded
with current funding sources. In these cases, alternative funding sources would be sought,
such as research or teaching assistantships in departments that currently fund few or no
statistics graduate students.
The verbal descriptions in Table 1 characterize how aggressive a decision is relative to
the uncertainty. For example, 20 offers is the break-even point, because with that number
the department is equally likely to lose TA positions as to have to seek additional funding
sources. Similarly, 23 offers is described as “bold” because there is only one chance in three
of losing TA positions, but a larger chance of having to seek additional positions.
Given these numbers, the then department chair decided to take a “bold” stance and make
23 offers. Under the previous system fewer offers would likely have been made. In the event,
the department was able to fund the students who accepted the offers quite comfortably,
so that the bold stance turned out well. The previous expectation-based more conservative
approach could have led to several TA positions being lost to the department, as in the
preceding years. The probabilistic approach made it possible to go beyond the break-even
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Number of offers=12
Lost TA positions
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
Number of offers=17
Lost TA positions
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
Number of offers=20
Lost TA positions
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
Number of offers=23
Lost TA positions
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
Number of offers=30
Lost TA positions
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
Figure 6: Conditional Probabilistic Forecasts of the Number of Lost Teaching Assistant
Positions given Different Numbers of Graduate Student Offers with Funding. Negative values
indicate the number of students that would not be funded from current funding sources.
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Table 1: Percentiles of the Predictive Distributions of the Conditional Probabilistic Fore-
casts of the Number of Lost Teaching Assistant Positions given Different Numbers of Grad-
uate Student Offers with Funding. Negative values indicate the number of students that
would not be funded from current funding sources.
#Offers 10% 33% 50% 67% 90% Description
12 0 2 3 5 7 Very conservative
17 -3 0 1 2 5 Conservative
20 -4 -2 0 1 4 Break-even
23 -6 -3 -2 0 3 Bold
30 -9 -6 -5 -3 0 Very bold
point, and to quantify the risk in so doing, thus helping the decision-maker to decide how far
beyond the break-even point to go. Given this successful outcome, the department decided
to continue to use this approach, which has now been used in four successive years.
The decision to be made in this case involves trading off losses of different kinds (lost TA
positions against the possible need to seek additional funding sources outside the department,
which could be difficult and stressful). Thus it would seem like a possible candidate for
formal decision analysis, especially given that the decision-makers are trained statisticians.
Nevertheless, a loss function was not assessed at any point, and decision theory was not
used; the predictive distributions by themselves provided enough information to the decision-
maker. After the fact, it seems possible to argue that the decision-maker was using a loss
function under which losing a TA position was twice as bad as having to find funding for an
additional student outside current sources, but if so this was never explicitly articulated.
It would be possible to improve the statistical model used for generating the probabilistic
forecasts. For example, the students the department ranks most highly for funding typically
are less likely to accept the offer, because they often have more options. However, the model
assumes that all students with an offer are equally likely to accept it; it would be possible to
relax this assumption. Also, a second round of offers is sometimes made, depending on initial
responses to the first round of offers. It would be possible to extend the model to include
the second round, about which decisions are currently made without similar quantitative
analysis. But overall, the method seems developed enough to provide useful guidance to
the decision-makers, and there has not yet been a strong demand for further methodological
refinement.
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7 Discussion
I have described five cases in which probabilistic forecasts have been used with a certain
degree of success. These lead me to identify five types of potential user of probabilistic
forecasts (where the five cases don’t map exactly onto the five types of user):
1. Low Stakes User: This is a user for whom the stakes are low and/or the losses from
over- and underpredicting are similar. An example might be someone deciding whether
to wear a sweater or a short-sleeved shirt based on temperature; a single “best” tem-
perature forecast will often be enough in this case.
2. General Assessor : This is a user for whom the probabilistic forecast provides a general
assessment of the likely quality of the forecast. The UNAIDS annual report is a possible
example. This is important also for the process of forecast improvement. The goal of
forecast development should be to improve forecast accuracy, and hence to reduce the
uncertainty around the forecast (Soneji and King, 2012). It is hard to guide this process
without an accurate assessment of forecast uncertainty.
3. Change Assessor: For this kind of user, the probabilistic forecast provides a way of
assessing whether a change in some measurement is in line with expectations, or in-
stead is a source of concern warranting action. An example might be the probabilistic
forecasts of HIV prevalence produced by UNAIDS, where some changes (including in-
creases) are to be expected, but larger increases that are “significant” would sound an
alarm. One-number forecasts provide no way of making this kind of assessment.
4. Risk Avoider: Here the goal includes keeping the risk of an adverse outcome to an
acceptable level. The IWC bowhead whale quota is a good example of this, in which
the risk of possible damage to the stock from aboriginal whaling was to be kept to a
low level. Note that this did lead to a “one number” forecast, but the forecast was
not the “best” or “central” forecast, but rather a lower percentile of the predictive
distribution, in this case the 5th percentile.
5. Decision Theorist: This user has an explicit loss function and is able to quantify it. He
or she uses the probabilistic forecast to explicitly minimize expected loss, as advocated
by formal decision theory. This did not arise in any of the cases I described, and seems
most likely when the different kinds of possible loss being traded off are on the same
scale, typically money. One example would a wind energy company, which needs to
bid on a contract to supply a given amount of energy, with specified penalties if the
contract is not fulfilled (Pinson et al., 2007).
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The fact that there are different types of user and use of probabilistic forecasts suggests
that it is important for developers of probabilistic forecasts to interact with users and consider
their goals. While this may seem obvious, it is often not done. Interaction can take the form
of direct contact (meetings, phone, email and so on) between developers and users. This can
be in the context of an established scientific advisory committee with regular meetings and
an official membership (as used by the IWC), or a small less formal reference group with
rotating members (as used by UNAIDS), or expert group meetings, which are effectively
workshops lasting several days (as used by the UN Population Division). If the probabilistic
forecasts are delivered to the general public using a website (as in the case of probabilistic
weather forecasting), the interaction can take the form of a web survey (Joslyn and Savelli,
2010).
It is important for trust in the forecast that the probabilistic statements be at least ap-
proximately calibrated, so that, for example, events given predictive probability 80% happen
about 80% of the time on average. For the forecast to be useful, it is also important that
forecast intervals be narrow, or sharp, enough to provide a basis for action. Indeed, Gneiting
et al. (2007) defined the key design principle of probabilistic forecasting as being to maximize
sharpness subject to calibration, and this has been widely accepted.
The experience I have described suggests that formal decision theory, much advocated in
theory by statisticians and economists, may have less practical application than sometimes
claimed. One reason may be that people are often not aware of their loss functions. Another
may be that using formal decision theory greatly increases the cognitive load, in that one’s
loss function has to be assessed and then the decision theoretic calculations performed. One
also needs to be careful because in practice people tend to attribute different values to
equivalent losses and gains, contrary to decision theory, a finding referred to as “prospect
theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Nevertheless, a recent result suggests that the scope of decision theory may be wider than
I have conceded. Gneiting (2011) showed that if the loss function is generalized piecewise
linear as a function of the quantity being predicted probabilistically, then the optimal point
forecast is a quantile of the predictive distribution. An important special case of this is
when the cost of an overestimate is a fixed multiple of the cost of an underestimate. This
will often be at least roughly true, and it may be much easier to elicit that multiple than
the full loss function. People may be able to say, at least approximately, how much worse
an overestimate is than an underestimate, or vice versa. This also greatly simplifies the
practical use of decision theory, reducing it to the calculation of a predictive quantile, so
that the cognitive load is little greater than that of probabilistic forecasting by itself.
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One overarching conclusion is that people can use and understand probabilities and
probabilistic forecasts, even if they do not have advanced training in statistics. The cognitive
research shows that probabilistic forecasts lead to better decision-making than deterministic
ones, and also to increased trust in the forecast by users. Experience with probabilistic
weather forecasting and probabilistic population projection websites has shown that there is
considerable public interest in probabilistic forecasts, even in the absence of much publicity.
This suggests that once probabilistic forecasts become available in a domain, they will be
used: “Build it and they will come.”
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